THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND CRIMES OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE LIMITS OF THE VICTIM'S TESTIMONY AS ISOLATED EVIDENCE

Abstract

This article analyzes the limitations of victim testimony as sole evidence in sexual violence crimes in light of the principle of presumption of innocence enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic. The general objective is to verify whether the victim's isolated word alone sustains a criminal conviction without compromising the constitutional guarantees of the accused. A descriptive, qualitative research approach is used, including a doctrinal review and analysis of decisions from higher courts. The research examines sexual crimes and finds that these offenses, due to their clandestine nature, present evidentiary weaknesses resulting from the ephemeral nature of traces and the fallibility of human memory. The results demonstrate that the majority doctrine and the jurisprudence of the higher courts condition conviction on the existence of peripheral elements corroborating the victim's word. Comparative analysis shows that legal systems such as the Spanish and Colombian require persistence and corroboration of the account, adopting the standard "beyond a reasonable doubt." It concludes that the victim's isolated testimony is insufficient to support a conviction, under penalty of violating the presumption of innocence and the principle of in dubio pro reo. Therefore, valuing the victim's word does not mean transforming it into a presumption of guilt, but recognizing its weight within a balanced evidentiary system that requires corroboration.